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AM I PKI OR NON-PKI?
Pipit Rochijat
(Translated with an Afterword by Ben Anderson)
The questions "PKI or Non-PKI," and "Marxist or Non-Marxist" are exactly 
the same as the questions "Chinese or Non-Chinese," 1 "Chinese Halfbreed or 
Non-Chinese Halfbreed,"2 "Arab or Non-Arab," "Muslimextremist or Non-Muslim- 
e x tre m ist," 1 23 and so forth. Questions in this vein do not raise the issue 
of a person's views or thought, merely that of his or her "color." If the 
"color" isn 't d esirab le , then n e ith er a re  the  views. But all this aside, 
I refuse to answer questions of this type. My reasons I append below. Let 
me ask forgiveness in advance if they seem too long. It can’t  be helped.
After his transfer in 1959 from the Semboro sugar factory in Jember, M. 
Kartawidjaja held the post of director of the Ngadirejo sugar factory in Kediri 
up until 1967. In 1967-68 he became Inspector of Sugar Factories in Semarang. 
In the following year he was appointed Director-in-Chief of State Plantation 
XXI in Situbondo, and took up his quarters in Surabaya.
His job as director of the Ngadirejo sugar factory was no easy one, since 
from 1959 on all Dutch sugar plantations in Indonesia were nationalized and 
managed by the Department of Agriculture. In addition, a politicization and 
political polarization among the various labor unions became strongly evident. 
At the Ngadirejo sugar factory there were three such labor unions: the Serikat 
Buruh Gula [Sugar Workers' Union], or SBG, a mass-organization affiliated 
with the Communist Party [PKI]; the Sarikat Buruh Gula Muslimin Indonesia 
[Muslim Sugar Workers' Union of Indonesia], or Sarbumusi, attached to the 
NU; and the Kesatuan Buruh Gula [Union of Sugar Workers], or KBG, associated 
with the PNI.
Even though th e  sugar factory has been nationalized, its "social life" 
did not change—Dutch culture remained firmly in place. At the Ngadirejo
1. Early in the New Order period, the Suharto government changed the official 
designation of people of Chinese ancestry (regardless of citizenship) from the 
neutral, polite tionghoa to the pejorative etna. This usage has caught on to the 
point that younger-generation Indonesians, even those without racial prejudices, 
have become accustomed to using it in everyday speech. The author here uses 
the word cina with deliberate irony. Because the translator feels th at the 
in some ways apposite "Chink" is now an anachronism in English, he has decided 
to use "Chinese," which, however, must be read in the light of the above.
2. Blasteran—a Dutch-derived slur-word for people of mixed racial ancestry.
3. P artly  for technical-syntactic reasons, partly because the words "Islam 
Ekstrim" are effectively combined into a single expression in official ideological 
parlance, the translator has coined the portmanteau-word "Muslimextremist."
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sugar factory there was a stratum of "employees" (the director, the deputy 
director, the sugar inspector, the skilled machinists, the chief of transport, 
etc.—about 30-40 people all told) and a stratum of "workers" (permanent and 
seasonal laborers, drivers, security guards, and so on). Note that seasonal 
laborers were taken only during the milling season, which a t Ngadirejo lasted 
4-5 months, but varied from factory to factory. In some places, the season 
lasted only three months. It all depended on the size of the factory and 
the extent of the surrounding sugar plantations.
Each stratum ^  had its own particular pleasures, e.g.:
1) Only the children of employees were entitled to ride the school bus 
provided free by the sugar factory for attendance at primary schools, high 
schools and college in Kediri. The distance from Ngadirejo to Kediri was 
14 kilom eters, from Semboro to Jember 35. If workers’ children wanted to 
attend regular high schools or trade schools, they had to go to Kediri (there 
was a primary school near the factory)? they had three choices: a) going by 
bicycle—a 28 kilometer round trip. And because the main road between Ngadirejo 
and Kediri ran parallel with the river Brantas, the wind usually blew pretty 
hard. If the wind blew from North to South, coming home from school was pretty 
easy, you were pushed along by the wind. But getting to school could be pretty  
rough. By the time you got to school, you could be more or less wiped out.
b) by using public transportation (bus, oplet [minibus]) at your own expense.
c) by walking or bicycling 4 kilometers to Ngadiluwih, and there catching 
the train. Again, this would be at your own expense.
2) Good movies (usually from the West, e.g., cowboy or dracula movies) 
were shown in the Club (S usitet),4 5 6 and only the families of employees were 
entitled to attend.
3) R ecreatio n al fa c ilitie s  such as the swimming pool, tennis courts, 
and ping-pong tables, for example, were for the enjoyment of employee families 
alone. (It was not unusual to hear the kids of employees say that if the 
kids of workers were allowed to swim in the swimming pool, they’d most likely 
catch some skin disease—panu or kadas 6—from them.)
4) Transportation was made available for employee families to amuse them­
selves in Kediri. Usually on Wednesdays, and Saturday afternoons and evenings.
5) Transportation was also provided for employee families to go to the 
sugar fac to ry ’s hospital in Pare, 25 kilometers northeast of Kediri and 40 
kilom eters from the Ngadirejo factory itself. For the workers, the local 
factory  clinic was sufficient. Unless the illness was very serious. In the 
eyes of employee families, this clinic was unattractive because the person 
on duty there was merely a ”mantri" [male nurse-practitioner]—OK only for 
applying iodine or raw alcohol on scratches—not a "doctor." On the other 
hand, in Pare patients were attended by a "doctor."
4. The author uses, deliberately, the politically neutral word lapisan rather 
than kelas (class).
5. In colonial times, in each sizeable town and each cluster of plantations, 
there was usually a SociSteit, or clubhouse for the recreation of the Europeans 
(and occasionally a ris to c ra tic  indigenes). As noted h ere , th is tradition 
continued almost without a break in post-colonial times, except that the new 
eligibles for clubhouse membership were the salaried employees.
6. Two types of skin infections common among the undernourished.
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6) If the factory organized a celebration for the opening of the milling 
season, the workers were permitted to enjoy only the night fair and the all-night 
wayang kulit. Whereas the employees could enjoy more classy [top] performances: 
fo r example, the Ngadirejo sugar factory once hired Lilis Suryani—a "top” 
Indonesian singer of the 1960s.
Aside from th e  examples mentioned above, sugar factory directors like 
M. Kartawidjaja were provided with a pretty large house: two sitting rooms 
(one for unimportant and unfamiliar guests, one for important and familiar 
ones), 1 special bedroom for guests, 4 other bedrooms, 1 dining room, 3 bathrooms 
with johns, 3 servants’ rooms, 1 kitchen, 1 bathroom and john for servants, 
1 storeroom, 1 pantry, and 2 garages (one Nissan jeep and one Mercedes 190, 
along with two chauffeurs). Aside from 3 maids (plus one boy), two male servants 
were also employed there.
The PKI Versus Kartawidjaja
Twenty-five kilometers east of Kediri lay the debris of the former Jengkol 
sugar factory. In the old days, it had been a privately owned sugar factory, 
but then  i t  was destroyed in the war [i.e., Revolution of 1945-49]. What 
survived was only the houses of the employees and the vast, scattered lands 
of the plantation itself. In 1962 the Department of Agriculture planned to 
unify these various sugar lands in the Jengkol area and then integrate them 
with the Ngadirejo sugar factory. In this way the sugar acreage owned by the 
Ngadirejo sugar factory would be greatly enlarged and its productive capacity 
greatly increased. Unfortunately, this plan for unifying the plantation land- 
holdings meant sacrificing the homes of local residents. These people would 
have to move out, and be relocated in places designated/set aside by the govern­
ment. Now this plan was opposed by the PKI along with its mass organizations, 
such as th e  Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI [Indonesian Peasant League]), the 
Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Gerwani [Indonesian Women’s Movement]), the SBG, 
or the Pemuda Rakyat [People's Youth]. When their protests had no effect, 
in the end the masses assembled within the PKI could no longer be controlled. 
They buried alive a bulldozer driver and a policeman. This aksi? aroused 
a reaction in turn. Troops were brought in, and the PKI masses resisted them. 
The story goes that those in the front line were members of Gerwani. Maybe 
people thought that no way would the troops fire on women. But in the end, 
the  soldiers did fire. And PKI victims fell. In fact so many victims fell 
that the news was reported in Radio Australia's Indonesian language broadcasts. 
And this clash proved to be the beginning of the conflict between the PKI 
(especially the SBG) and M. Kartawidjaja.
From th at time on, at every opportunity—whether rallies or parades/proces- 
sions—these slogans always appeared: "Retool Karta," "Karta Kabir," "Karta 
ex-Masyumi," "K arta Seven Village Devils," and so on—all terms currently 
popular at that tim e.7 8
7. The classical, Dutch-derived term for a demonstration, procession, or 
other show of public political intent.
8. These terms refer to the official and to the Communist terminology of 
the  Guided Democracy period (1959-65). "Retool [RttuI]" meant dismissing 
or tra n sfe rrin g  a politically unsatisfactory official; Kabir, an acronym for 
k a p ita lis  b iro k ra t,  re fe rred  to  those officials (m ost often military men) 
who abused their positions in the nationalized enterprises to make private
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And Kartaw idjaja’s five sons were constantly forced to listen to abuse 
and read the slogans displayed in their [the PKI's] banners. Their ears got 
pretty  red, their hearts felt on fire, and their th irst for revenge steadily 
increased.
Aside from rallies and parades, the SBG also continually organized demon­
s tra tio n s  at the sugar factory. In addition to "Retool Karta," etc., their 
demands included "provision of buses for the children of workers who want 
to go to school in Kediri."
In spite of the SBG's hostility, M. Kartawidjaja was defended by Sarbumusi 
(and the NU), as well as the KBG (and the PNI/Marhaenist Front). The only 
problem was that, so it was reported, the SBG’s membership equaled that of 
the other two unions combined. Evidently the SBG was more popular and more 
attractive to the sugar workers.
In the period just prior to G30S,9 10 Kartawidjaja's policy in dealing with 
the SBG’s demands became ever more disliked. For example, he dealt with strikes 
by workers who joined and were organized by the SBG by cutting their wages. 
And then gave the money as bonuses to those workers who did not strike (naturally 
those associated with the Sarbumusi and the KBG).
The conflict between the PKI and Kartawidjaja was by no means the only 
political conflict in the Kediri region. For example, some time in 1964 a PNI 
village headman in the Gurah area (10 kilometers east of Kediri) was said to 
have been struck with a machete by [someone from] the PKI over a land dispute. 
Naturally, the PNI and the NU didn't take this lying down (to facilitate  identi­
ficatio n , they always had their combined squads wear palm leaves attached 
to their left wrists). And Roman war—like in the movies—beeame unavoidable. 
As you know, no one had any firearms—all that was available was sharp weapons. 
Conflicts such as these raised the political temperature in the Kediri region. 
In addition (maybe because we have a lot of public holidays, and because that 
was the period of Trikora/Dwikora, 1° parades and mass rallies were frequently 
organized. "Retool Karta," "Karta Kabir," etc., became part of everyday language.
An atmosphere so inflamed naturally affected the schools where Kartawidjaja's 
boys were studying. Quite often, for example, Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2 was 
vilified as "Son of a Kabir," "Son of an ex-Masyumi," "Son of the Seven Village 
Devils," etc., by members of the Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar Indonesia (IPPI [League 
of Indonesian High-School Students])/PKI. In addition to his antipathy for 
the PKI and his desire to defend his father, Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 was also 
a member of the Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia (GSNI [Movement of Indonesian 
N ationalist High-School Students]), affiliated with the PNI/Marhaenist Front.
fortunes; Masyumi was the great party of Islamic reform, founded in 1945 and 
banned by Sukarno in 1960 on the grounds th at many of its leaders had been 
involved in the regional rebellions of 1958-59; the Seven Village Devils (Tujuh 
Setan Desa) was a PKI phrase for seven different types of village-level exploiters.
9. I.e., the Gerakan 30 September (September 30th Movement), led ostensibly 
by Lt.-Col. Untung, which on the morning of October 1, 1965 assassinated six 
leading generals and briefly seized various key installations in Jakarta.
10. Trikora = Tri Komando Rakyat (People’s Three Commands), Sukarno's slogan 
describing the effort to force the Dutch out of West Irian (1960-62). Dwikora = 
Dwi Komando Rakyat (People's Twin Commands), a comparable slogan for the anti- 
Malaysia campaign of 1963-65.
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Even though his father’s family was devoutly religious (being Sundanese and 
many having been to  Mecca), and he himself prayed regularly, yet he chose to 
join the PNI, not the NU. The reason was th at he was a fan of Bung Kamo 
[President Sukarno]—even though he did not understand what was meant by "Mar- 
haenism is Marxism applied and adapted to Indonesian conditions"'ll—such being 
one course he took in the GSNI’s "caderization" program for its members. The 
more violent the attacks of the SBG/PKI on Kartawidjaja, the more actively 
K artaw id jaja’s Son No. 2 participated in the activities of the PNI. Every 
time there was a parade he always joined in. Like the uniforms of other PNI 
people, his clothes too were blackest black.
In the immediate pre-G30S period, the SBG organized a meeting in the workers’ 
hall in M argersari (a workers' residential area). Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 
and an Ambonese friend of his, Max Kakiay, went to spy on it. An amazing 
number of people attended. The topic of the meeting was all the "bad things" 
about K artaw idjaja. Accordingly, they agreed to organize a demonstration 
against him. The plan was to prevent him entering his office when he came 
to work.
But the two spies had no chance to overhear the whole discussion—they 
were suddenly surrounded by the meeting’s security guards, most of them from 
the PKI’s People's Youth. Even though they were sitting there shrouded in 
their sarongs. The two of them got the opportunity to be yelled a t as "dogs" 
of the Seven Village Devils, and so forth. In the end, they went off home.
The news of the SBG plan—which was no secret—spread rapidly. It so 
happened that at that time an all-East Java conference of the Sarbumusi was 
being held at the Ngadirejo sugar factory. When they heard about the plan, 
they immediately mobilized their mass support, with the additional support 
of santri [devout Muslims] from the various pondok and pesantr'en [traditionalist 
rural Muslim schools] in the Kediri area. Not to be left behind, the PNI too 
mobilized its masses. On the morning of the planned SBG attem pt to prevent 
Kartawidjaja entering his office, the roadway in front of his home was jampacked 
with NU and PNI masses—who also guarded the house. You can imagine how heated 
the political atmosphere was. Each side brought with it the dynamite of pent-up 
hatred. Fortunately, a physical clash didn't take place, as troops had been 
brought in to keep the situation orderly.
In fact, Kartawidjaja's position wasn't that bad. Precisely because he was 
regarded by the PKI as their number one [local] enemy, the NU, the PNI, and the 
local Kodim [Komando Distrik Militer—Military District Command] commander, for 
example, were sympathetic to him. Quite often, leaders of the NU (e.g., Kyai 
Haji Machrus from the Pondok Lirboyo) or of the PNI would come and visit him at 
his home. Naturally they were received in the [inner] reception room reserved 
for important and intimate guests. (Note: Chinese traders, such as dealers in 
sugar or automobile spare parts like Pak Ang Kok, who had got the nickname 
"The Hunchback Champ," were usually received in the front reception room.)
In contrast to the gifts typically brought by the Chinese dealers (such as 
cooked food, Chinese-style cakes, tape recorders, etc.), those brought by the 
kyai who headed pondok and pesantren were usually in the form of prayers and 
blessings. On one occasion a kyai gave [Kartawidjaja] a belt inscribed with 1
11. A formulation of Sukarno which was la ter adopted by the PNI (Nationalist 
P arty ) leadership  in an e ffo rt to  adapt itself to the increasingly leftis t 
ideological climate of late  Guided Democracy.
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verses from the Qur'an, [others] gave texts from the Qur'an to be hung above 
the doors inside the house. All were meant as protection against the danger 
of the kafir [infidels].
As for relations with Chinese dealers: Kartawidjaja once told his sons 
th at actually there was no need for the director of a sugar factory to be 
corrupt (embezzle the factory's money). The reason was that all his m aterial 
needs would always be satisfied by the Chinese dealers. The gifts he would 
receive from them would always exceed his salary. The Chinese dealers merely 
asked/hoped to be given the opportunity (if possible a monopoly) to  buy up 
his sugar, or scrap iron—or, the right to [monopolize] the sale of automobile
parts, rice and cloth to fulfill the needs of the factory’s workers.
If Kartawidjaja went to Surabaya on business, or went off [on vacation] 
w ith his family, it was normal to eat in Chinese restaurants. After all, 
everything th e re  was completely free. Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 once said 
to his father "These Chinese are great, huh?" Kartawidjaja merely replied, 
"They're not 'great.' For the moment they need your father. But just watch 
what happens when your father is no longer director."
Just as it was outside, so the atmosphere in school was pretty  hot. The 
pupils were divided into Nationalist, Religious and Communist Youth groups. 
And again, just as it was outside, the Communist youth, for example the IPPI, 
stood alone. The others worked together, in organizing parades and in meetings. 
The rising [political] temperature towards the end of 1965 was very tangible,
in school and outside. In 1965 Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 was in the first
grade of Kediri's State Senior High School.
The Situation during G30S 1965
Up to 1965, the [national] front was divided in two: on the one side the 
Communist Front, and on the other the United Nationalist-Religious Front. 
And their respective strengths were about evenly balanced. For some reason 
or other, PKI strength in the region of Kediri, Tulungagung and Blitar was 
especially conspicuous. Maybe there was some kind of spillover from Madiun 
towards Kediri.
The events of October 1, 1965 are something difficult, impossible to forget. 
The atmosphere was so tense, as though everyone was expecting something [cata­
strophic] once the takeover of power in Jakarta  had been broadcast. All Karta­
widjaja said to his family was: "Watch out, be very careful. Something's gone 
very wrong in Jakarta." Usually the doors and windows of the house were shut 
around 10:00 p.m., but on October 1 they were closed a t 7:00. Fear seized the 
Kartawidjaja family, for the rumor th at the PKI had made a coup and murdered 
the generals was already spreading. The PKI's own aggressive attitude and the 
way in which the generals had been killed strengthened the suspicion of PKI 
involvement. "Such brutal murders could only be the work of kafirs, i.e., the 
Communists," was the kind of comment that one then heard. At the same time, 
the Kartawidjaja family felt very thankful that General Nasution had escaped 
with his life .12 The only pity was that his little  daughter was beyond rescue. 
For almost two weeks, everything was quiet in the Kediri region. People merely
12. General A. H. Nasution was a t the time Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces 
and Minister of Defense. When the Untung group attacked his home on the morning 
of October 1, the general's little  daughter was killed by a stray bullet.
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stayed on the alert and tensely watchful. In State High School No. 1 too the 
atmosphere was very heated. Reports that it was the PKI that had gone into 
rebellion spread rapidly. At every opportunity the Nationalist and Religious 
groups v ilified  th e  stu d en ts involved with IPPI. For its part, IPPI took 
evasive action and rejected all "accusations." They claimed to know nothing 
about what had happened. They said th at the events in Jakarta were a m atter of 
the Council of Generals.
About two weeks after the events of October 1, the NU (especially their 
Ansor Youth) began to move, holding demonstrations which were joined by the 
santri masses from the pondok and pesantren around Kediri. They demanded the 
dissolution of the PKI, and that the death of each general be paid for with 
those of 100,000 Communists. Offices and other buildings owned by the PKI were 
attacked and reduced to rubble by the demonstrators. It was said that about 
11 Communists died for nothing, simply because they were foolish enough to feel 
bound to defend PKI property. In an atmosphere of crisis suffused with so much 
hatred for the PKI, everything became permissible. A fter all, wasn't it everyone's 
responsibility to fight the kafir? And vengeance against the PKI seemed only 
right, since people felt that the Party had gone beyond the pale. So, the fact 
that only 11 Communists had [so far] died was regarded as completely inadequate. 
This kind of thinking also infected Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2.
Yet there was a [strange] episode which is worth mentioning here. To 
the east of the Kediri municipal bus station there was a certain PKI office. 
Actually, it was really only an ordinary house. But in front of it there was 
a signboard bearing all those names smelling of the PKI: from the PKI itself 
through the BTI, Gerwani and IPPI, to the People's Youth. It so happened 
that when the demonstrators arrived in front of that house, they found an 
old man out in front getting a bit of fresh air. They asked him whether he 
was a member of the PKI. "No," he answered, "I’m a member of the BTI." "Same 
thing!" yelled a number of the demonstrators as they started beating him. 
He toppled over, moaning with pain. He was lucky not to be killed. But the 
house was demolished as a result of the rage of the masses. And, as usual, 
before carrying out their task, the NU masses roared "Allahu Akbar [Allah 
is Great]!" After this bloody demonstration, Kediri became calm once more. 
Only the atmosphere stayed tense. And this went on for about 3-4 weeks.
Wanted: Communists13
Once the mesmerizing calm had ended, the massacres began. Not only the NU 
masses, but also those of the PNI joined in. The army didn't get much involved. 
First to be raided were workers' quarters at the sugar factory. Usually at 
n ight . . .  to eliminate the Communist elements. It was done like this: a 
particular village would be surrounded by squads of Nationalist and Religious 
Youth (Muslim and Christian [P rotestant], for example in Pare). A mass of 
Ansor Youth would be brought in from the various pondok and pesantren in the 
Kediri region. On average, about 3,000 people would be involved. The expectation 
was that, with the village surrounded, no Communist elements would be able to 
escape.
It was pretty  effective too. Each day, as Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 went to, 
or returned from, State Senior High School No. 1, he always saw corpses of
13. The word "wanted" is in English in the original text,
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Communists floating in the River Brantas. The thing was that the school was 
located to the "kulon" (west) of the river. And usually the corpses were no 
longer recognizable as human. Headless. Stomachs torn open. The smell was 
unbelievable. To make sure they didn't sink, the carcasses were deliberately 
tied to, or impaled on, bamboo stakes. And the departure of corpses from 
the Kediri region down the Brantas achieved its golden age when bodies were 
stacked together on rafts over which the PKI banner proudly flew.
In those areas through which the Brantas did not wind, the corpses were, 
as you'd expect, buried in mass graves—as, for example, around Pare. There 
the C hristian  [Protestant] masses were very active. But then, the export 
of corpses down the Brantas began to bother the city of Surabaya. The rumor 
went round that the drinking water was filtered out of the river. And by 
the time they reached Surabaya, the corpses were in complete decay. After 
protests from Surabaya, PKI were no longer flung into the Brantas, but were 
disposed of in mass graves. The prepared holes were dug pretty  big, and were 
thus capable of handling dozens of Communists at a time.
Furthermore, a t one time the road leading up to Mount Klotok (to  the west 
of Kediri city) was decorated with PKI heads.
About 1 kilometer to the north of the Ngadirejo sugar factory, you'd find 
a lot of houses of prostitution. Once the purge of Communist elements got 
under way, clients stopped coming for sexual satisfaction. The reason: most 
c lie n ts—and p ro s titu te s —were too frightened, for, hanging up in front of 
the houses, there were a lot of male Communist genitals—like bananas hung 
out for sale.
Naturally, such mass killings were welcomed by the Nationalist and Reli­
gious groups. Indeed, [th ey  f e l t , ]  the target of 100,000 Communist lives 
for 1 general's had to be achieved. It was the same for Kartawidjaja's Son 
No. 2 and his family. Specially when they got the word that for the Karta- 
widjaja family a Crocodile Hole14 had been prepared, for use if the PKI were 
victorious.
This atmosphere of vengeance spread everywhere. Not merely in the outside 
world, but even into the schools, for example State High School No. 1. There 
the atmosphere was all the more ripe in that for all practical purposes the 
school broke down, and classes did not continue as usual. Many students did 
not come to school a t all, like Syom, for example, a friend of Kartawidjaja’s 
Son No. 2, who had to spend most of his time going round helping purge the 
Kediri region of Communist elements. Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 saw many cases 
where teachers and student members of IPPI a t State High School No. 1 were 
held up a t  knife point by their Nationalist and Religious comrades. With 
the knives a t their throats they were threatened with death. They wept, begging 
forgiveness and expressing regret for what they had done while members of 
IPPI. In the  end a ll th e  se cre ts  came out (or maybe false confessions). 
Each person tried to save himself a t another's expense. After all, they were 
human beings too, and thus still wished to enjoy life.
14. Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole) was the name for the area, within the Halim 
Perdanakusumah Air Base perimeter, where the bodies of the assassinated generals 
were disposed of (down a disused well). In 1965-66 a successful psychological 
warfare campaign was launched by the army to persuade anti-Communist notables 
and political leaders that the PKI had secretly prepared thousands of comparable 
"holes" for their burial a fter execution.
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It was evident that the Kediri area was unsafe for Communists (strangely 
enough, except in one instance, they made no move to offer any resistance). 
So most of them tried to flee to Surabaya or sought protection a t the Kediri 
City Kodim. But even in jail they were not safe. Too many of them sought 
safety there, and the jail could not take them all in. In the end, the army 
often trucked them off to Mt. Klotok (the road there passed by State High 
School No. 1). Who knows what the army did with them there—what was clear 
was th at the trucks went off fully loaded and came back empty. Furthermore, 
the Kodim had no objections a t all if people from the Nationalist or Religious 
groups came to ask for [certain] Communists they needed. The Kodim was prepared 
to turn over Communist prisoners, provided those who needed them brought their 
own transportation (not including motorbikes, of course).
At S ta te  High School No. 1 student activity proceeded calmly. It was 
practically like long vacation except for continuing to assemble a t school. On 
one occasion a teacher asked Syom, the friend of Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2, where 
he’d been all this time, never coming to school. And indeed, he had seldom 
showed up. He answered: "On tour [of inspection], sir." And people understood 
what he meant by "on tour." For aside from being an acronym of turn kana-turu 
k6n6 (sleeping there, sleeping here), it also meant "busy eliminating Communists." 
Syom was one of the executioners. And the fame of an executioner was measured 
by the number of victims whose lives he succeeded in taking.
Usually, those Communists whom people had managed to round up were turned 
over to an executioner, so th at he could despatch their souls to another world. 
Not everyone is capable of killing (though there are some exceptions). According 
to what a number of executioners themselves claimed (for Kartawidjaja's Son 
No. 2 had many friends among them), killing isn’t  easy. After despatching 
the  f ir s t  victim, one’s body usually fee ls  feverish  and one can’t sleep. 
But once one has sent off a lot of souls to another world, one gets used to 
killing. " I t’s ju s t like butchering a g o at,"  th ey ’d claim. And the fact 
is that Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 often stole out of the house, either to  help 
guard the [local] PNI headquarters located in the home of Pak Salim (the driver 
of the school bus in the area around Ngadirejo) or to watch the despatch of 
human souls. This too made sleeping difficult. Remembering the moans of 
the victims as they begged for mercy, the sound of the blood bursting from 
the victims' bodies, or the spouting of fresh blood when a victim was beheaded. 
All of this pretty  much made one's hair stand on end. To say nothing of the 
screams of a Gerwani leader as her vagina was pierced with a sharpened bamboo 
pole. Many of the corpses lay sprawled like chickens after decapitation.
But even though such events were pretty horrifying, the participants fe lt 
thankful to have been given the chance to join in destroying infidels. Not to 
mention the stories brought back by Maha, a friend of Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2, 
who participated in eliminating the Communists in the Pare area. He was a 
Christian. What he said was that the victims were taken off by truck and then 
set down in front of holes prepared in advance. Then their heads were lopped 
off with a Samurai [sword] th at had been left behind by a Japanese soldier in 
the past. When the mission was accomplished, the holes were filled in with 
earth.
And among so many incidents, naturally there were a few which still remain a 
"beautiful" memory for Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2. For example, when the Ansor 
Youth surrounded a particular village to the east of the sugar factory, they went 
into a number of houses to clean out the Communist elements. In one house, as 
it  happened, there were two kids living there who were listed as activists in
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the People's Youth. When the Ansor people knocked a t the door, it was the parents 
of the two hunted boys who answered. "Where are your sons?" "If it's possible, 
please don't le t my boys be killed"—such was the request of the old couple. 
They offered to give up their own lives in their children’s stead. Not merely 
was this offer accepted, but the exterminators also killed their two children.
Next: even though Kartawidjaja was hated by the PKI, on one occasion he 
told Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2 to go to the home of pak Haryo, an employee 
who lived next door and was an activist in the SBG. Kartawidjaja told him 
to fetch pak Haryo to the house and have him sleep there, bringing with him 
whatever clothes he needed. But since it was then pretty la te  a t night, when 
Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 knocked at the door, pak Haryo's family made no response. 
Maybe they were afraid that it might be the Angel of Death come visiting. 
The next morning, Kartawidjaja came himself to pick up pak Haryo. Subsequently 
he was taken by Kartawidjaja to Surabaya, to be hidden there.
N aturally , helping Communists wasn't a t all in line with the ideas of 
Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2. So he asked: "Dad, why are you of all people protecting 
pak Haryo?" "Pak Haryo doesn't know a thing, and besides it would be a shame 
with all his kids."
Kartawidjaja was fortunate in that he was always informed about "who and who" 
was to lose his life. And many Communists who had once vilified Kartawidjaja 
now came to his house to ask for protection. On one occasion he set aside 
a special space in the meeting hall where people asking for his protection 
could overnight.
All through the purges, the mosques were packed with Communist visitors. 
Even the Workers' Hall was specially made over into a place for Friday prayers. 
As a result, many people judged th at the PKI people had now become sadar [aware: 
of their past errors, of Allah's tru th ]. And hopes for survival became increas­
ingly widespread. And at one of these Friday prayers, Kartawidjaja was asked 
to make a speech in front of all the assembled worshippers. He told them 
that "praying isn't compulsory. Don't force people to do it. Let those who 
want to pray pray. And if people don't want to, then they don’t have to."
The interesting thing is that even though Kartawidjaja spoke in this vein 
(just imagine, in a time like that, the slightest thing could get one accused 
of being a Communist), and even though he protected many PKI people, he was never 
accused of being a Communist or involved in G30S. In fact, with the triumph of 
the Nationalist and Religious groups over the Communists, Kartawidjaja was 
appointed as adviser to the East Java Sarbumusi and the East Java KBG. And many 
of his friends—especially Islamic leaders (even till today)—came to his house.
It seemed then that because he was friends with pak Maksum, the head of 
the Sarbumusi organization in the Ngadirejo factory, his speech in front of 
the Friday worshippers was not a problem.
In fact, [the idea] that prayer is good, but that no one should be forced 
to do it, formed [part of] the lessons on "individual liberty" that Kartawidjaja 
taught to his sons.
Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 1, who joined KAMI [Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indone­
sia—Indonesian Students' Action Front] 15 and was politically active in Bandung, 15
15. The vanguard of the coalition of student organizations mobilized to  topple 
the Sukarno regime between December 1965 and March 1966. It was dominated by 
Muslims, Christians (Catholic and Protestant), and people from the Outer Islands.
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was forced into frequent disagreements with Son No. 2, an activist in GSNI. 
The reason was that Bung Kamo's [legitimacy] had begun to be questioned by 
KAMI. Bung Karno was accused of being involved in G30S because he protected 
the PKI. But the PNI/FM of Kediri never questioned Bung Karno [’s leadership]. 
What was clear was th at the Kediri PNI continued to stand behind Bung Karno 
and [yet] was anti-Communist. Their attitude was to hell with the PNI Asu and 
the PNI Osa-Usep.16 17 If this disagreement between Son No. 1 and Son No. 2 
spilled over into family life, Kartawidjaja rarely intervened. He never once 
forbade his sons to side with anyone. Every person [he believed] should know 
what he or she is doing. "You there, take care of your own business." One 
incident th at Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2 never forgot happened like this: Once
the Communist elements in Kediri had been destroyed, if he wanted to visit his 
grandfather in Bandung he had to catch the train a t Kertosono. And in the 
Kertosono railway station he encountered a pretty  heart-wrenching scene. A 
mass of 5-10 year old kids milled round begging the passengers to have pity on 
them and give them a little  something to eat. And if food was tossed out of 
the carriage window, these kids swarmed in to fight over it. There was nothing 
there to separate dogs from human beings. Before the outbreak of G30S one 
never saw scenes like this. And people knew th at these kids milling aimlessly 
around were the children of Communists. With their parents dead, what did 
they have left to hope for? Still, in spite of the many pretty heart-stopping 
incidents, Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 felt thankful that the Chinese-owned [private] 
schools had been taken over by non-Communist elements. After all, hadn’t 
they had much too close connections with the Chinese People’s Republic?
The New Order Devours Its  Allies
About a year after G30S, when the Kediri region had been completely purged 
of Communist elements, people felt the wind of the New Order blowing there 
with the arrival of RPKAD [Army Paratroop Regiment] troops. They came in 
stealthily, and it was said that they were quartered a t the Kediri Commercial 
Senior High School. With the entry of the RPKAD it became clear th at the 
target was no longer the Communists, but rather the PNI/Marhaenist Front. 
On one occasion, Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 got the chance to attend a mass 
rally in the Kediri football stadium, organized by people from the Nationalist 
and Religious groups. He took his place in the marching ranks of the GSNI. 
When they got to the stadium, the ranks of the PNI and its mass organizations 
were immediately greeted with the yells "Smash the PNI Asu!" "Crush the remnants 
of the Old Order!" (As of th at tme, the Kediri PNI still acknowledged Ali 
and Surachman as the PNI’s [national] chairman and secretary, since there 
had still been no decision as to who would become the All-Indonesian Chairman
16. After the October 1, 1965 "coup," the PNI split into two factions: one, 
led by party Chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo and Secretary-General Ir. Surachman 
(often referred to by the derisive acronym asu ["dog" in Javanese], continued 
to support Sukarno and hold to the party’s left-wing ideological formulations. 
The other, led by two Sundanese politicians, Osa Maliki and Usep Ranuwidjaja, 
attempted to make common cause with the ascendant military.
17. In the aftermath of the "coup," the military started a campaign alleging 
that the Untung group had had secret military backing from the Chinese Embassy 
in J a k a rta  as well as directly from Peking. This campaign eventually led 
to the breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two states.
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of the PNI; but the Kediri PNI was still anti-Communist). Hearing these yells, 
with the atmosphere so violent, Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 fled home in terror. 
"Weird,” he thought, "we used to be comrades-in-arms, how come we're now enemies?"
The process of destroying the PNI and Sukarnoism went hand in hand with 
the  formation of KAMI/KAPPI [Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar2 Indonesia—Indonesian 
High School Students' Action Front], Previously, a t S tate High School No. 1, 
students accused of being "baby Communists" were persecuted by students from 
the Nationalist and Religious groups; now, however, the position of the Nationalist 
students was completely reversed. Now they were persecuted by the Religious 
Group students who were banded together in KAPPI. And they were accused of 
being Old Order elements.
It was in those days th at Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 had frequent occasion 
to observe how slanders begin to spread. The [PNI] principles stated that 
the Marhaenists would always be victorious, but in the face of New Order forces 
poised to  snatch one's life, who could hold out/resist? The torrent of ideological 
change flowed very fast. All depended on power.
Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2 himself saw how the RPKAD participated in destroying 
the central PNI building on Kediri’s Daha Street. Later on, when the smashed 
glass windows had to be boarded over with planks, they were used for knife-throwing 
targ et practice. And isn't the RPKAD best known as an elite  unit expert in 
knife-throwing?
In this critical situation, the Nationalists were very lucky to have the 
KKO [Marines] and the Navy on their side. So that the RPKAD’s pressure could 
be contained.
Even though Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 was in a difficult position as a 
member of the GSNI, still—and this was the most important thing—his father's 
position remained stable. He had been among those who had done yeoman service 
in wiping out the PKI in the Kediri area and many of his friends came from 
the Religious Group (the NU). In other words, New Order elements too.
These connections turned out to be very useful when Kartawidjaja's Son 
No. 2 was forced to cool his heels in jail. It happened like this: Around
1967, a big parade was organized in Kediri. State High School No. 1 contributed 
a unit dressed in a variety of different kinds of clothes: some of the kids 
were in sarungs, others in patched pants, and so on. One, however, came dressed 
as a haji. And for the duration of the parade, he walked along counting money. 
I t  appeared th a t  he intended to  s a tir iz e  hajis as calculating skinflints. 
In the end, he was kidnapped by the Ansor Youth just as his unit was proceeding 
along Daha Street. But his disappearance was only noticed after the parade 
was over. And because Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 was a leader of State High 
School No. l's parade unit, he had to share responsibility for the behavior 
of the participant dressed up as a haji. So he was summoned by the Kodim.
When he got there, the problem turned out not to be why he had permitted 
one of his group to dress up as a money-counting haji; rather it spread to 
the question of the Old Order and the New Order. "What organization are you 
active in?" "What are your views on the Old Order and the New Order?" and 
so on. His interrogation went on pretty  long; from la te  afternoon to the 
middle of the night. After that, he was put into a cell in the building th at 
had once been the Chinese school. A great many Old Order remnants were also 
confined there. In his cell he reencountered the kid who had dressed up as 
a haji for the procession. He swore up and down. "Goddamit. After working 
with KAPPI, what do I get? Kidnapped! Put in jail!" And the two of them
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tried to kill time in their cell. Sometimes they were allowed out if they 
really had to go to the toilet. Both were equally bemused as to why they 
had to sit in jail. After all, they weren’t  Communists. The one was accused 
of in su ltin g  Islam by dressing up as a haji and counting money. In fact, 
he averred, what he meant to satirize was the behavior of most hajis. Besides, 
he and his family were [good] Muslims, but closer to the Masyumi than to the 
NU. His elder brothers were all active in the ranks of the HMI [Himpunan 
Mahasiswa Islam—Islamic Student Association].
And Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 himself could not understand why he had to 
be put into a cell. Why had his activities in the GSNI suddenly become the 
issue? With the times changing so fast, how could he possibly figure out 
what was going on? One day he was overjoyed a t participating in the destruction 
of the PKI, the next he was bewildered at finding himself crushed by the New 
Order. Luckily, however, he wasn’t shut away for long—his family’s political 
connections w ere s ti l l  pretty good. In 1967, Kartawidjaja was transferred 
to Semarang with the post of Inspector of Sugar Factories there. And the 
following year he was again transferred, this time to Surabaya, where he became 
Chief Director of Sugar Factories in the region of Situbondo, overseeing about 
5 separate factories.
The higher he rose, the more the PKI-filled past gradually faded, and 
the  more Chinese businessmen came to call. Since in practice his position 
was higher than that of the directors of single sugar factories, the ’’presents” 
brought to him by these Chinese were really unbelievable: A Mercedes 280, 
a F iat 125, several motorcycles (so many in fact that they couldn’t all be 
used, and some remained stored in their packing cases in the storehouse/gudang), 
refrigerators, air conditioners, stereo sets, etc. These Chinese businessmen 
were of big-city caliber, not the small-town types he had dealt with before. 
But they remained just as "great" as those in Kediri. Still, this "greatness" 
could not avoid, in the end, being put to the test; for in 1970 Kartawidjaja 
was forced to yield up his post to a brigadier-general from the army who had 
his eyes on it. The pretexts for his removal were the usual: corruption, 
of course, embezzlement, of course. At one point the whole story appeared 
in the magazine Skets Masa (if my memory serves me right). 18 Kartawidjaja 
was orig inally  determined to bring his case before the courts, as he felt 
his reputation had been damaged. In the end, however, he was forced to abandon 
the idea when his lawyer advised strongly against it. The lawyer told him 
his dismissal was a political m atter, and thus was not justiciable. Bringing 
the case to court would mean only further harm to the family. What political 
reasons? He wasn’t  a Communist. But then who dared to resist/fight such 
"heroes" of the New Order as the army? In spite of all this, after a year 
of enforced idleness, he was given other posts; first in Solo, then in Surabaya. 
All this again thanks to family connections. The interesting thing was what 
happened during his year of unemployment. What happened to the Chinese businessmen 
who so often had brought him gifts? Vanished without a trace! Evidently 
they had found a new master [tuan].
In 1969 Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 took his seat in the classrooms of the 
ITB [Bandung Institute of Technology]. A year later, the Rend Conrad affair 
exploded: 18 an ITB student was shot dead by the Mobile Police. It was said 189
18. A popular magazine published in Surabaya during the late  1950s and 1960s.
19. The student, an Eurasian of partly Dutch ancestry, was actually named 
Coenraad.
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th at the killer was a student at the Police Academy and the son of a general. 
But the one who took the rap was a low-ranking member of the Mobile Police. 
He was cashiered~and the Bandung students collected money to help him and 
his family. The affair taught him [Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2] how easily the 
military took to their guns. But on this occasion at least, the crowd was 
so great that they did not feel ready for a confrontation—even though their 
tanks were deployed along the streets.
In West Germany: New Experiences
By now Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2 had a pretty extensive ’’supply" of experiences: 
those of his family's conflict with the PKI, and those of the case in which 
the New Order undermined (menggerogoti) 20 the family, maybe simply for the 
reason that Kartawidjaja was "merely" a civilian. Yet at the same time an 
instructive lesson could be drawn from the two periods—Old Order and New 
Order. Though Kartawidjaja had never joined a party, let alone been active 
in one, the simple fact that he held the post of sugar factory director meant 
that the PKI was determined to wipe him out. (Kartawidjaja was the type of 
family man who wants only to be left in peace to do his job for the sake of 
his wife and children). In the New Order period, he was crushed under the 
existing policy of preserving important posts for, and divvying up the goodies 
among, the military (if it were not so, it wouldn't be the New Order period, 
a f te r  all). Accordingly, there’s no need for surprise that the Kartawidjaja 
family was often completely bewildered by the speed of all these changes. 
Above all, Kartawidjaja's wife finally ended up simply seeking God's protection: 
the harder the times, the more she prayed. For man-made laws, so it  seemed, 
protected only those with power.
Kartawidjaja’s Son No. 2 brought all these experiences with him to West 
Germany. Association with Germans did much to open his eyes. One thing th at 
particularly struck him was that his German friends refused to accept such 
statem ents as "Communists are evil," "liberals are evil," "atheists are evil," 
"leftists are evil," as sufficient in themselves, needing no further justifica­
tion. Yet it was just this kind of "reasoning" that Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2 
had heard and experienced so often in the b itter times when the PKI was in its 
heyday. At the same time he learned a lot from all these experiences. For 
example, many people had had to be killed because of their ignorance (ketidak- 
tahuan mereka). And he himself had gotten involved in the destroying of the 
PKI out of ignorance—simply for the emotional reason th at "daddy" was being 
retooled by the PKI, and so he had tried to defend him. Why did so many PKI 
people have to be killed? After all, they begged for mercy before being killed, 
and most of them were just ordinary people, who had no idea what was going 
on. Or even what communism really was. Just imagine—most of the people 
in the Nationalist or Religious Groups were firmly convinced th at Communists 
w ere a th e is ts . Kartawidjaja's Son No.2 had once tried to raise this in a 
conversation with a bicycle-(tire) repairman. All the man had said was: "Ah, 
young master, it's not true. The Communists are like everyone else—those 
that want to pray, pray; those that don't, don't. It's up to them." Thought 
Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2: "Huh?? What kind of Communists are these?" Again, 
why did so many schoolkids have to pay with their lives for joining IPPI (just 20
20. An ironic use of one of the most popular Javanese-derived political expres­
sions of the Sukarno period.
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imagine, many of them w ere s t i l l  first-year high-school students!)? What 
did they know about anything? On the other hand, what about the real PKI 
bigshots (pentolan)? Like the head of the Ngadirejo SBG, for example, who 
managed to escape with his skin.
Thanks to the opportunity provided him in West Germany to study all ideologies 
quite freely, he began to get new ideas. If someone studies sociology here 
and is required to read up on the theories of Karl Marx—and comes to agree 
with them, why does he have to be in the wrong (harus sal ah)? Influenced? 
Then who’s to blame? The one who influences or the one who is influenced? 
Why not simply raze his university to the ground, to make sure that such theories 
do not ’’corrupt" th e  minds of Indonesian students? And if Kartawidjaja's 
Son No. 2, after many years of working in the office of some German leftists  
where no one was called Boss or underling, decided this was OK, why should 
th is  be forbidden? After all, the whole thing was really simply a m atter 
of opinion. Whether one agreed or not. If one didn’t agree, fine. If one 
did, fine too. Why then the bans? Why the accusations? Why should someone 
be killed simply for holding certain ideas? After all, a t the time, the PKI 
was quite legal. And if the party was not then banned, why shouldn't people 
be fre e  to  join it?  I t's  th e ir  a ffa ir, a f te r  all. Maybe, in their view, 
it was a good thing. Something they'd turned over and over in their minds. 
And if the PKI had a huge membership, well th at simply showed their popularity. 
Maybe they were good salesmen.
On the other hand, if the DI [Darul Islam] went into rebellion, why weren’t 
all Muslims slaughtered?21 And why were the PNI people crushed, despite the 
fact that they had helped destroy the PKI in the Keditf region? Again, if 
the Army leadership rebelled—as they did on several occasions in the past-w hy 
was the Army too not dissolved? And even if the PKI was [rightly] regarded 
as in rebellion, why did Bung Karno have to step down from his throne? And 
why was he not put on trial?
What was clear was that the problem of the Old Order and the New Order 
(why they so easily devoured their own children) was a problem of system. 
Such was the final conclusion drawn by Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2. And who 
really is meant by "Kartawidjaja's Son No. 2"? None other than the present 
writer: I, Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja.
PKI or Non-PKI Is not Important
With this brief background sketch now provided (a full account is still in 
process), I am ready to answer the question: am I PKI or not? As a m atter of 
principle, I refuse to answer questions of this type. For in essence they are 
the same kind of questions as: "You’re a Chinese, aren’t you?" "You’re a Chinese 
halfbreed, aren’t you?" "You’re an Arab, aren’t you?" And so on. If you’re a 
Communist, then your opinions are [automatically] no good. If you’re a Chinese, 
then (all the more so!) your intentions are no good. Questions of this kind 
serve only to show that in the mind of the questioner what is important is not 
really opinions, but simply "color." Aside from whether he was a Communist 
or not, Mao managed to feed the immense population of the PRC. Aside from 
whether he is a Muslim or not, Gaddhafi has managed to create a society worthy
21. A reference to armed insurrections to establish an Islamic sta te  which 
were active in Java, Aceh, and South Sulawesi between 1949 and 1964.
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of imitation. So what’s the point of claiming that we are more Pancasilaist 
than anyone, when on the one hand the common people [raJcyat] live on the edge 
of starvation, and on the other the powers-that-be live it up. As my father 
used to say, "You can even be a Communist if you want to"—though he didn’t  
like the idea~"so long as you have principles." And I feel the same way. 
People can call you whatever they like—that's up to them to evaluate/judge. 
And I certainly wouldn’t  try to forbid them from doing so. If you want to 
do something you regard as right, well that's up to you. If you choose to 
have the mentality of the Chinese businessmen when my father still held office 
(i.e., if need be, put on a smiling face), that's OK. If you want to butter 
up the Communists so as to get certain amenities of life, but then pretend 
to forget this when the atmosphere changes and people s ta rt ridiculing "PKI 
hangers-on," that's OK too. If you choose to outyell everyone else with your 
"revolutionary" demands as a way of winning friends in certain quarters, and 
then  fe e l compelled to put all gears in reverse in order to  survive, well 
that's OK too. If you want to be two-faced, claiming to be a le ftis t in front 
of leftists, and a true loyalist in the presence of the powers-that-be, that 
too is all right.
For all these reasons, comrades mine (watch out though if you use this 
terminology, since, so far as I know, the only person who liked to use it 
was Aidit, the king of Indonesian Communists in the old days; 22 before you 
know it, you could be accused of being a Communist!): don’t keep on asking 
what I am. I myself never give a damn where you come from and what your color 
is. "It’s up to you, take care of it yourself. The important thing is simply 
to have some principles."
Now to conclude. The truth  is that I have the following fantasy: How
wonderful it  would be if the Communists were totally wiped out, so that the 
world would be permanently rid of communism. Then the question "Are you Communist 
or non-Communist?" would become unimaginable. Next, all the Muslim extremists 
would be cut down to the last man. Then the question "Are you a Muslimextremist 
or a Non-Muslimextremist?" would never arise. And if need be, non-Muslimextremists 
could also be eliminated. A fter that, the Chinese would be eradicated root 
and branch. Then the question "Are you a Chinese or a non-Chinese?" wouldn't 
exist. To put it in a nutshell, everything regarded as filthy would be wiped 
clean. And once the world was completely clean, only one simple question 
would remain: "You [sic, in English], you’re re....lated  to Pak Harto, aren’t 
you?" Now then....w hat would happen n ex t?23
22. Dipa Nusantara Aidit was chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party from 
1951 till his violent death in the immediate aftermath of the October 1, 1965 
"coup."
23. The original Indonesian reads: "You suuudaranya pak Harto bukan?" rather 
than the expected "Anda saudarnya pak Harto bukan?" In a le tte r  to the translator 
explaining the point he is thereby making, the author writes: "If you often 
run into officials, the way I did when I was an officeholder of the PPI, you 
find they always use [the English word] 'you.' The idea is to 'warm up' the 
relationship—so they don't use bapak [father] or anak [son], saudara or anda 
[form al second person pronouns]. In e ffect, these officials use 'you' to 
lu re  young troublemakers into becoming their friends. And usually we fall 
in to  the  trap , and act friendly—even if only on the surface. As for the 
question  of why I used 'suuudaranya' rather than 'saudaranya'—well, all of 




Since the terrible last months of 1965, all scholars of Indonesia, 
and especially those trying to penetrate the country’s character, 
are in the uncomfortable position of knowing that a vast internal 
trauma has shaken their subject, but not knowing, more than vaguely, 
what its effects have been. . . . Surely, so great a catastrophe, 
especially as i t  mostly occurred in v illag es among villagers, 
can hardly have left the country unmoved, yet how far and how 
perm anently it  has been moved is impossible to say. Emotions 
surface extremely gradually, if extremely powerfully, in Indonesia: 
"The crocodile is quick to sink,” they say, "but slow to come 
up." Both w ritings on Indonesian p o lities and those politics 
themselves are permeated right now with the inconfidence derived 
from waiting for that crocodile to come up.
Clifford Geertz, 1972
So it is. Exactly twenty years have passed since the massacres of late  
1965, in which probably between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Indonesians died a t the 
hands of other Indonesians, and still only the crocodile's shadow has begun 
to surface. For two decades, winners and losers, killers and survivors, have 
for their different reasons, maintained an eerie silence about most of what 
happened and what its consequences have been; and this silence is, in a way, 
the foundation on which General Suharto’s New Order, like the post-matanza 
El Salvador of General Maximiliano Martfnez, is based.
Here and there, once in a while, the quiet has been stirred by w riters of 
fiction, usually in the form of short stories read only by the happy few; 2*
bigshot—no m atte r  how ’distant.’ For example, oh he’s my father-in-law ’s 
aunt's husband's grandmother’s cousin. When you get that far, the right word 
is 'suuudara' [r e . . . . la t iv e ] ,  not saudara. I meant this as a sarcastic dig 
a t those ’Melayu’ students in West Berlin who claim to be related to various 
bigshots and happily collect the business-cards of officials with whom they 
come in contact."
24. See, for example, those translated by Harry Aveling in Gestapu: Indonesian 
Short Stories on the Abortive Communist Coup of 30 September 1965 (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1975). This tex t 
includes versions of Ki Panjikusmin [pseud.j's "Domba Kain [Cain's Lamb]" 
and "Bintang Maut [Star of Death"; Usamah’s "Perang dan Manusia [War and Man]"; 
Mohammad Sjoekoer's "Maut [Death]"; Satyagraha Hoerip’s "Pada Titik Kulminasi 
[At the Culminating Point]"; H. G. Ugati's "Ancaman" [Threat]"; Gerson Poyk's 
"Perempuan dan anak-anaknya [A Woman and her Children]"; Zulidahlan's "Maka 
sempurnalah penderitaan saya di muka bumi [And so my Sufferings on this Earth 
are  Complete]"; Martin Aleida's "Malam Kelabu [Gray Night]"; and Sosiawan 
Nugroho's "Sebuah perjoangan kecil [A Small Struggle]." All these tales originally 
appeared in the little  literary magazines Horison and Sastra. A better translation 
of Usmah's text, prepared by Helen Jervis, appeared in Indonesia 9 (October
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not surprisingly , perhaps, the character of these fictions is fatalistic  and 
expiatory. It is as if a storm swept over the society for which no one was 
responsible, and in its inexplicable wake what should waft naturally in is 
resignation and common understanding. Apotropaic measures against the rising 
shadow.
But now the silence has really been broken, and in an altogether astonishing 
way. In the March 1984 issue of Gotong-Royong, issued by the West Berlin branch 
of the Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia [Indonesian Students' Association] of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja, a perennial graduate 
student in electrical engineering, published the article "Saya PKI atau Bukan 
PKI?!" translated above. In this tex t Pipit has described his own experiences 
as a high school student in Kediri in 1965-67, first as an incidental target 
of the  Communist Party (PKI)'s campaign against his father, director of a 
large state-owned sugar factory; then as a participant-observer of the bloody 
purges of 1965-66, in which some of his best friends became local executioners 
(algoio); and finally, as a victim of the effective destruction of the Nationalist 
Party (PNI) to whose local student organization he was then attached.
Since the tex t speaks eloquently for itself, it would be inappropriate to 
attem pt any elaborate commentary. I will therefore confine myself to a few 
brief remarks on why it appeared when and where it did, and on the implications 
of its idiosyncratic style.
For well-known reasons postwar West Berlin has been an unusual city, haven of 
students and spies, a rtists  and tourists, radicals, refugees, and gastarbeiters. 
Because of its physical separation from the rest of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, its status under the Four Power Agreement of 1945, and its would-be 
status as a beacon of Western freedom in a sea of Communist tyranny, it enjoyed 
a good deal of political autonomy from early on. Even in the heyday of Konrad 
Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Party, the city's long-standing leftwing traditions 
assured that it was a bastion of the Social Democratic Party, and it remained so 
right up to the early 1980s. Since the Federal Republic was by treaty  barred 
from deploying troops or enforcing conscription there, West Berlin rather 
quickly became an asylum for radical and pacifist German youths anxious to 
escape the draft. In the 1970s, moreover, many survivors of the radical student 
movements of the late  1960s found refuge within its environs. This political 
ambience made it an attractive place for Third World leftists exiled from their 
homelands and out of favor with the various ruling groups in the Eastern bloc. 
This attraction was further enhanced by the relative powerlessness of local 
consulates and by the Bonn government’s generous support for and subsidization 
of foreign students.
Accordingly, already in the middle 1970s there was in West Berlin a signif­
icant group of Old Left Indonesian exiles, most of them people who had earlier 
been stranded in the PRC, the USSR, and the states of Eastern Europe. By 
1977, there were increasing numbers of young Indonesian students coming direct 
from Jakarta, either on government scholarships, or, more often, private funds. 
In the aftermath of the massive student protests of 1977-78 in Indonesia, and
1970): 89-100. Two very well-known stories by Umar Kayam, "Bawuk [the name 
of the heroine]" and "Musim gugur kembali di Connecticut [It is Fall again 
in Connecticut]" are available in English versions in Aveling's From Surabaya 
to  Armageddon: Indonesian Short Stories (Singapore: Heinemann Educational 
Books [Asia], 1976). See also Yudistira Ardi Nugraha's novel Mencoba tidak  
menyerah [Trying Not to Give In] (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979).
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the  Suharto government’s violent, and eventually successful, suppression of 
these protests, youthful opposition sentiment found its freest outlet overseas, 
in Western Europe generally, but especially in West Berlin and the Netherlands.
From about 1977 some of these students began following the example of 
the Old Left exiles in putting out a variety of publications—news bulletins 
and ephemeral magazines—which discussed the students’ own problems as well 
of those of Indonesia; by 1979, many of these innovations had become partly 
in s titu tio n a liz e d . Like so many other students in Western Europe in this 
period, the Indonesian students were influenced by post-1968 European youth 
cu ltu re , w ith its  odd m ixture of skepticism , radicalism , and eclecticism. 
Thus in their thinking they drew on neo-Marxist writings, Islamic works, Max 
Weber, Clifford Geertz, sundry Anglo-Saxon Indonesianists, and so forth, but 
the content was consistently critical of the Indonesian government. Sometimes 
the tone was serious and straightforward, at other times sarcastic and mocking. 
From the sta rt, the students recognized th at they were a diverse group, united 
mainly by their oppositionist stance, and so laid much more stress on the free 
flow of opinion and the need for critical thought, than on organizational 
consolidation. Many felt th at it was precisely the emphasis in Indonesia's 
p o litica l p ast on organization  and organizational solidarity over creative 
political thinking that had caused the country so much distress.
The official representatives of the Indonesian government in the FDR, 
ambassadors, consuls, cultural attaches, and Bakin operatives responded to 
these activities in a variety of ways. Some tried a "soft" approach, offering 
financial subsidies in exchange for better behavior, urging more "constructive" 
criticism, and warning about the damage to Indonesia's external image done by 
the student opposition. Others adopted a hard line, recruiting informers among 
the students, threatening the abrogation of passports, and accusing activists 
of being tools or new members of the PKI. In fact, though some elderly members 
of the PKI resident in West Berlin did attem pt to recruit among the students, 
the relationship between them was typically one of scarcely veiled antagonism. 
The old men tended to patronize the students as politically inexperienced, 
and to  c ritic iz e  them as frivolous and irresponsible, "liberal" in political 
and sexual m atters, and, above all, disrespectful of their elders. The youngsters 
objected to what they felt were the authoritarian habits, conspiratorial style, 
and frozen thinking of the veterans. In this way, many of the more thoughtful, 
courageous students found themselves branded automatically as "PKI" by officialdom, 
and as "non-PKI," i.e., empty-headed opportunists, by the Old Left.
I t  was in p ro te s t ag ain st th is  branding, this insistence on "political 
color" rather than on individual thoughts, opinions, and analyses, this automatic 
com partm entalization  of fellow Indonesians as "this" or "that," "pro" and 
"contra," th a t  P ip it R ochijat K artaw idjaja  w rote, w ith characteristically 
ironic punctuation, "Saya PKI atau Bukan-PKI?!" The immediate occasion was 
a provocative open le tte r  in the previous issue of Gotong-Royong by an ex-student 
a c tiv is t, which urged him to cease evasions and sta te  openly and candidly 
what his true colors were: PKI or Non-PKI. Thus the whole thrust of his reply 
was to show, by means of his own political history, how men change, and how 
meaningless and dangerous such "eolor"-thinking has been for Indonesia. In 
his view, it  was precisely this kind of thinking that was most responsible 
for the catastrophe of 1965-66.
This stance also helps to illuminate the distinctive Pipit prose style, 
which quite deliberately revives the characteristic vocabulary of the Old Order 
and the Old Left but jarringly mixes it up with New Order officialese, as
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well as contemporary youth argot. Thus one finds juxtaposed on the same page 
"ormas" and "retool" — "mandiri" and "fasilitas" — "lebih top" and "drakula." 
The effect is a curious combination of jagoan insolence and ill-concealed 
compassion. The style is intended to keep all vocabularies in view; none 
ought, or can, be eliminated from Indonesia's history and current experience. 
Forgetting the catastrophe, pretending it did not happen, and even imprisoning 
oneself in the languages that precipitated it—all merely encourage a political 
culture that will condemn Indonesia to repeat its past. This too is why Pipit 
insists on his former friendships with, not democrats, or Pancasilaist heroes 
of the New Order, or pious Muslims and Christians, or freedom-fighters but 
with algojo; and why he writes such unforgettable sentences as "Pengiriman 
mayat dari daerah2 Kediri lewat sungai Brantas mengalami masa keemasan, ketika 
mayat2 disatukan dan diletakkan di atas rakit dengan bendera PKI yang terpajang 
megah di atas rakit tersebut" and "Alasan: banyak yang takut (baik pengunjung 
maupun para pelacur) karena di depan rumah2 tersebut banyak digantungi kemaluan 
laki2 PKI—mirip jualan pisang."
